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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 13-4139 
________________ 
 
JULIUS LOCKHART 
A.J.L., by her parent, 
   Appellants 
v. 
 
CITY OF EASTON; ERIC CAMPBELL; 
KEVIN KRISCHE; LARRY PALMER, 
    
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. No. 5-12-cv-00133) 
 
District Judge:  Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 20, 2014 
 
Before:  MCKEE, Chief Judge, RENDELL, SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed December 11, 2014) 
 
______________________ 
 
OPINION 
 
______________________
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This is a § 1983 case against several police officers and the City of Easton, 
Pennsylvania, following searches, executed pursuant to search warrants issued by a 
neutral and detached magistrate judge, of the property owned by Appellant Julius 
Lockhart (“Lockhart”) while his minor daughter, Appellant A. Lockhart (“A.L.”), was 
present at his home.  Lockhart and A.L. (collectively “Appellants”) filed suit in the 
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas alleging various causes of action pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 including excessive force, false arrest, deprivation of property without due 
process, and municipal liability.  Appellants’ complaint also contains several state 
constitutional and tort claims.  Appellees Larry Palmer, Kevin Krische, Eric Campbell, 
and the City of Easton (collectively “Appellees”) removed the case to federal court.  The 
District Court granted summary judgment to Appellees.  Appellants appealed.  We will 
affirm. 
 In a thorough and well-reasoned Memorandum Opinion, the District Court 
explained why it was granting summary judgment on all of Appellants’ claims.  See 
Lockhart v. City of Easton, No. 12-0133, 2013 WL 5225234 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2013).  
The District Court reasoned that the warrant affidavits gave the magistrate judge a 
“substantial basis” for concluding that probable cause existed for the search warrants, and 
even if there was not a “substantial basis” for finding probable cause, Appellee Krische 
was entitled to qualified immunity because the affidavits were not “so obviously 
deficient.”  See id. at *6.  The District Court determined that Lockhart’s guilty plea to the 
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drug paraphernalia charge barred his § 1983 false-arrest claim under Heck v. Humphrey, 
512 U.S. 477 (1994).  The District Court concluded that the excessive-force claim failed 
because the decision to employ the Pennsylvania State Police’s Special Emergency 
Response Team (“SERT”) was objectively reasonable under the totality of the 
circumstances, particularly given Lockhart’s known possession of multiple registered 
firearms, Lockhart’s prior charges for carrying unlicensed firearms and for assault, and a 
known informant’s observation of men bagging cocaine while carrying handguns on the 
premises just days before.  The District Court reasoned that Appellants’ due-process 
claims lacked factual support.  And finally, the District Court concluded that the absence 
of an underlying constitutional violation precluded Appellants’ municipal liability claims.  
The District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Appellants’ 
remaining state-law claims.   
 We can add little to the District Court’s analysis and discussion except to note that 
Appellants on appeal attempt to undermine the validity of the warrants by dissecting the 
affidavits and addressing the shortcomings of individual paragraphs of the affidavits.  
This approach must fail as courts must employ a “totality-of-the-circumstances analysis” 
in determining the existence of probable cause for a warrant.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 238 (1983).  Moreover, the role of a court reviewing a challenge to a warrant issued 
by neutral and detached magistrate “is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 
substantial basis” for determining that the affiant had demonstrated probable cause.  Id. at 
238-39 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “[T]he conclusions of a neutral 
magistrate regarding probable cause are entitled to a great deal of deference by a 
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reviewing court, and the temptation to second-guess those conclusions should be 
avoided.”  United States v. Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2005).  Like the District 
Court, we find no cause for disturbing the finding of probable cause by the neutral and 
detached magistrate.   
 We also agree with the District Court that Appellees’ actions in executing the 
search warrants and arresting Lockhart were reasonable under the totality of the 
circumstances, and in the alternative, even if the actions were unreasonable, the 
individual Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity.  See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 
U.S. 223, 231 (2009).  Finally, we find that the District Court properly denied 
Appellants’ request for additional discovery because much of the evidence they seek was 
publicly available, and they have provided no reason why this discovery was not sought 
earlier or how it would be helpful to their claims. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court substantially for the reasons set 
forth in the District Court’s Memorandum and Order without further elaboration.   
 
